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Abstract 
The massive use of derivatives and securitisation by sovereign States for public 
debt and deficit management is a growing phenomenon in financial markets. 
Financial innovation can alter the stability of the public sector finance, and 
modify risks effectively run. The experience of some developed and developing 
countries is surveyed to look at main instruments used and aims of public 
finance. Financial stability of the public sector is analysed considering financial 
innovation use. The case of Italy and its scarce disclosure of information is 
presented. An IS-LM model is used to capture the effect of financial 
innovation on fiscal policy for high indebted (European) industrialised 
countries, with deficit constraints, starting from Blanchard (1981). The use of 
financial innovation can have various effects over debt and deficit 
management, given binding external burden (like the European criteria) in the 
short run as far as risks are properly considered, expectations of fiscal policy 
are coherent with that of markets, and no exogenous shock occurs. 
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Introduction 
Derivatives are far the biggest financial innovation used on modern 
financial markets worldwide; their notional amount has reached the value of 
$220 trillion OTC at end June 2004 with an increase of 12% over the last 
semester. Exchange traded derivatives reached the value of $ 288 trillion, with 
a fall of 5% over the last semester. The fall of exchange-traded derivatives is 
due mainly to more homogeneous expectations over future path of economic 
growth (BIS, 2004). 
Derivatives are widely used because of their high liquidity degree, low costs 
(if compared with the traditional equivalent investment) normal volatility level 
and leverage effects; market players are banks, non-financial firms and 
Sovereign States, according to the BIS survey; the disclosure about single 
investors’ exposure is not deep enough to get a complete picture of the 
situation from the BIS survey, but from 2005 on this lack will be improved. 
Sovereign States have recently incurred in these financial instruments because 
of their ability to provide hedging against interest and exchange rates, manage 
debt and sometimes helping in raising funds, e.g. by anticipating future tax 
revenue. Securitisation is another way Sovereign State manage assets, debt and 
current deficit, and is technically different from a swap contract although the 
economic functions are similar (high liquidity, reasonable costs and normal 
volatility). Some countries face internal and external budget constraints; 
European countries have Maastricht criteria to satisfy, other than domestic 
policy. Some countries have also introduced an increasing fiscal federalism, like 
Italy, and others have to deal with competitive financial markets where issuing 
bonds is not a cost-less operation. Financial assistance in both cases is a 
strategic tool to achieve financial stability, which represents a necessary goal of 
economic policy, being it fiscal or monetary.     
European countries characterised by high debt, like Italy, Belgium, and 
Greece, face two constraints: one over deficit level which should be no more 
than 3% of GDP and one over the path of debt, which should converge to 
60%. Getting out of the European Monetary Union is too costly for these 
countries, for various country-specific reasons1 and we will not get deeply into 
it, but we consider that domestic authorities do not consider it as possible. 
Recent analysis of financial innovation has not yet considers explicitly their 
role in public debt management, considering effects over financial stability. 
Our aim is then to introduce derivatives (and other similar financial innovation 
instruments) into policy analysis as to get a clearer picture of possible effects, 
and considering risks.   
Section 1 surveys some countries’ experiences over financial innovation use; 
section 2 surveys in details the situation of Italy and public administration’s use 
of derivatives and securitisation; section 3 looks at the implications of financial 
derivatives use by fiscal authorities; section 4 is devoted to the Blanchard 
                                                
1 See P. De Grawe, 2003, where cost-benefit analysis is developed. 
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(1981) model description and main reasons driving the study; section 5 
modifies it in order to consider explicitly derivatives in fiscal policy, 
equilibrium setting, and possible shocks. Finally concluding remarks summarise 
main findings and light the way over possible future research. 
 
1. Financial Innovation and Fiscal Policy: Some Countries’ 
Experience 
Financial innovation influences modern fiscal policy in two different ways: 
first, it helps in tax saving by taxpayers; secondly, financial innovation can be 
used by the State itself (centrally or locally) to lower the cost of debt, to 
improve the cash and debt management, and reduce costs (OECD, 2002). 
Instruments used by the taxpayers are derivatives, while the public sector 
can use derivatives and/or securitisation for debt management. Securitisation is 
a way to pool together credits and other financial assets (Assets Backed 
Security, ABS), sell them on the market to institutions, which utilise 
securitisation to finance their business. Assets are generally held by tax neutral 
vehicle (Special Purpose Vehicle, SPV), and it issues rated debt to fund the 
purchase of these assets. Derivatives used for public debt management are 
swaps, FRAs and many others, depending on needs, debt structure and 
characteristics.  
Looking at taxpayers, derivatives’ strategies are useful for tax timing option, 
i.e. postponing revenues and realising losses, as to lower the total amount of 
revenues, and then taxes to be paid; this has been shown for firms and 
households (see Zeng, 2004 and Salcedo, 2003 respectively) and then induce a 
loss in total revenues of the State.  
By helping taxpayers to lower their burden, derivatives confirm their nature, 
i.e. are used to shift risks and satisfy needs of customers, being more efficient 
than traditional financial instruments. The tax saving has been demonstrated in 
the US tax system by many authors and will not be taken as given; the 
European tax system is highly fragmented, and recently the European 
Commission has asked for homogenous definitions of what to tax and by 
whom, but not yet on how much, leaving it to the freedom of countries. Each 
European country has a different tax system for financial revenues and it 
increases tax arbitraging, since it is theoretically possible to move from a 
country to another and save. This could be confirmed looking at firms, which 
prefer lower tax rate countries, like Ireland (Fondazione La Malfa, 2002). 
Benefits of financial innovation’s use by Sovereign State are that it is an off-
balance sheet item and increases funds available to public sector, given budget 
criteria (e.g. Maastrict or IMF); increases international transparency, since 
capital markets are under intense international scrutiny; is alternative to 
privatisation, which is not always the sole solution to exploit public goods; 
diversifies investments and betters debt management. The clearness and 
disclosure of the strategy is very important for the market to believe in a 
sovereign State finance management. 
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Examples of countries actively using financial innovation to manage debt 
and deficit (locally and centrally) are known and we can briefly summarise 
them basing on a rough distinction: North America States, developed countries 
(Austria, Denmark, Greece, Italy) and developing ones (Brazil, Hungary, India, 
Israel). 
 North American States enjoy a high degree of fiscal autonomy thus 
rendering necessary to finance current expenditure, infrastructures other than 
raising taxes in order not to incur in any deficit; some of these States are even 
bigger than some Europeans so that the dimension of financing operations is 
high, together with the frequency. Over the last years most operations are due 
to interest rate hedging, debt management and infrastructure financing; this last 
purpose is particularly difficult to evaluate over future budget years since 
changes in rates can affect the cost of these swaps thus rendering necessary 
other issues. Disclosure of information about these operations is quite good, 
since main specialised newspapers report them. Historical data about past 
activities in derivatives is not available, rendering a comprehensive stress 
analysis not possible.   
 
 
Brazil has been hit by external shock over 2001 and effects last for 2002 
COUNTRY YEAR
NOTIONAL 
AMOUNT
DEBT/GDP % PURPOSE
Brasil 2002 $170 bln 54.5 $ swap
Hungray 2001 $150 mln 53.4 securitisation
India 1999 $10 bln 63 IR swap
Israel 2000 $200 mln 91 IR and currency swap
Austria 2001-2002 ! 13 bln 66.56 IR swap
Austria 2001-2002 ! 15 bln 67.3 currency swap
Denmark 2001 120.5DKK bln 47.77 swap
Italy 1999-2001 ! 6.5 bln 110 securitisation
Europe 2002 ! 145 bln 62.9 securitisation
Greece 2002 ! 3.745 bln 104.73 securitisation
Source of data on Derivatives: OECD, 2002; on debt/GDP: Datastream.
Table 2 Derivatives Use by Sovereign States
STATE YEAR
NOTIONAL 
AMOUNT INSTRUMENT
Massachussets 2001 1.3 bln $ IR swap
New Jersey 2004-2006 3 bln $ Swap
New York 2005-2006 2 bln $ IR swap
New York 1999-2004 5 bln $ IR swap
Texas-Houston 2004 200 mln $ Swap
Texas-Houston 2004 1.53 bln $ Securitisation
California 2004 600 mln $ IR swap
Source: the Bond Buyer (various issues)
PURPOSE
Table 1 Derivatives used by North America States
Lowering costs of 
financing
Future tax revenue 
Debt management and 
infrastructure financing
Interest rate hedging
Infrastructure financing
Interest rate hedging
Interest rate hedging
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and over. Currency depreciated by 40% in 9 months of 2001, FDI lowered and 
inflation increased; derivatives have been used to hedge against this adverse 
shock and instruments are dollar futures, interest rate futures, interest and 
exchange rates swaps, and forwards, for a total 170 billion dollars (December 
30th 2001). Monetary policy intervened to enhance liquidity in the market and 
increase overnight target rate.  Monetary and fiscal authority worked together 
to manage foreign exchange denominated debt and not boosting the exchange 
rate, issuing a dollar indexed bonds and supplying hedge to the market. 
Hungary, as a country willing to access the European Union, has to control 
monetary and real variables under strict rules; public debt outstanding reached 
the value of 30 billion euro, which is small compared to other European 
countries, and securitisation has been chosen as a debt and risk management 
technique. A marginal role is given to these innovative instruments, since 
market risks can be influenced. 
India has 63.7% debt over GDP ratio and uses extensively financial 
innovation to manage its costs. In March 2002 there were $10 billion of 
derivatives transactions outstanding. Derivatives allowed are swaps and FRAs, 
written on interest and exchange rates and in various forms (caps, collars). The 
massive use of these instruments has growth dramatically over the ‘90s and 
‘00s because of increasing deficit and internationalisation of trading. 
Derivatives are used to manage risks, increase liquidity of markets, attracting 
investors, and providing shorter dates on markets. 
Israel has debt over GDP ratio at 96% in 2001, 26% of which is foreign, 
and has introduced a single debt manager to enhance risk management, build 
an infrastructure for advanced pricing capability, and to find an optimal 
benchmark for liabilities portfolio. Derivatives are used “strategically in 
restructuring the liabilities portfolio vis-à-vis the benchmark”. Instruments 
used are swaps, collars, swap-options; derivatives are chosen basically on risk-
cost measures (efficient frontier) and to reshape the portfolio according to the 
benchmark. 
Austria uses derivatives since 1981 such as swaps, for long-term 
management, and FRAs, for short term, on interest and exchange rates. The 
Austrian Federal Financing Agency is the external agency in charge to raise 
funds and restructure portfolio; particular attention is due to credit risk and 
liquidity management. 
Denmark uses extensively derivatives for debt management and 
instruments are basically swaps: currency, interest rates, structured, liability, 
asset and portfolio. In 2001 the total principal amount outstanding was 121 
billion Danish krona (16 billion euro). Aim of this extensive use is to lower 
“long-term borrowing costs, while taking into account risks associated with the 
debt”2. Strict rating requirements support derivatives purchases together with 
the tendency toward plain vanilla style contract. 
                                                
2 Cf. “The role of derivatives in Danish debt policy”, in OECD, 2002. 
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Greece has used securitisation as a debt management instrument and has 
securitised credits coming from lottery, air traffic, and revenue from the EU. 
The amount of securitised assets is however, much lower than other European 
countries, and reached 3,745 million euro. 
Italy with its 106% debt over GDP ratio in 2003 is one of the most sensible 
country to debt management problems; securitisation is one of the instruments 
used to hedge public debt and it has been applied to the National Institute of 
Social Security (INPS), and to the Public Real Estate. Credits have been 
securitised and performances were different in the two cases, because of their 
different nature. Credits of National Security are financial assets which can be 
traded on the market, domestically and abroad, without much difficulty, while 
Italian public real estates have an incredible burden of rules, limits and 
privileges which let their trading more complicate and time consuming. 
However, both operations were successful and raise funds up to 9 billion 
euro3. The use of derivative instruments by the Italian public sector will be 
analysed in depth in the following paragraph. 
In its reducing costs trough the use of innovation, especially interest rate 
and currency swaps, what need to be carefully considered are risks effectively 
taken by the State. Credit, liquidity and market risks are related to derivatives’ 
use. Many crashes of firms and banks have been caused by some form of mis-
management (Barings, LTCM, and many others). Often only credit and market 
risks are considered, so that if a liquidity problem arises, it can have very bad 
effects. One example of public institution which did not considered liquidity 
risk in its derivatives investing strategy was the Orange County (California) 
which bankrupted in 1994, after having realised 1,6 billion losses.  As explained 
by Marthinsen (2003), the loss was due to mismanagement of funds by the 
County, which was unable to consider risk effectively run. The poor control 
and monitoring systems were unable to look after what was happening to 
County’s funds, which realised high revenues with very aggressive (and un-
hedged) financial operations, managed by Mr Citron, a self-educated blue-
collar of the County. Total portfolio of Orange County amounted to 7.6 billion 
dollars, all excess funds of the County and of 200 other municipal entities 
(schools, hospitals and so on). The Federal Reserve decided in February 1994 
to rise interest rates to avoid the US economy overheating4; portfolio of 
Orange County was made mainly by structured notes, fixed-income securities 
and inverse floating-rates notes, all interest rate sensible assets. Leverage of 
portfolio was more than 2.5 (trough the use of reverse repurchase agreements). 
The fund manager, Mr Citron, has bet on falling interest rates in designing the 
portfolio structure, so that in front of an unexpected monetary and credit 
restriction, at the beginning, he believed in the goodness of the strategy and 
doubled all positions5. At the end of 1994 the return of investment was –
                                                
3 Cf. “The role of securitisation of public assets: the Italian experience”, in OECD, 2002. 
4 Treasury Bill rate moved from 3.54 to 7.14% over 1994. 
5 This was the same mistake made by Mr. Leeson, which lead to the bankrupt of Barings Bank. 
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38.55%6. The news that the County had a bad structured portfolio induce all 
market players to ask back funds and close all positions with the County. 
Liquidity restrictions (and not credit or market risks) lead to the bankrupt of 
the County, which asked for Chapter 9 creditor protection. 
The role of derivatives in the crash is limited to the reverse repurchase 
agreements (a type of forward contract). However, inverse floating-rates notes 
are considered as derivatives-type instruments, so that the total derivatives-
related losses of the County was about 700 million dollars7. The general lesson 
to be learned by the Orange County crash is that safety, liquidity and high yield 
are not possible to reach together; an opaque and complicate investing strategy 
can create much risk than costs it saves (or profits it makes). 
 
 
2. The Case of Italy: Public Debt and Derivatives 
Local municipalities, thanks to increasing devolution of fiscal sovereignty, 
and of a fixed percentage of national income tax, must finance public services, 
like education or health care, and infrastructures, like roads, and transports. 
This has contributed to increase the fiscal pressure over taxpayers; Cities and 
Municipalities have introduced new taxes on real estate8, and Regions have 
introduced a tax on firms’ revenues9. On the other hand, they had to finance 
their deficit by issuing bonds. These bonds pay interest rate to holders, they 
have looked for hedging strategies against adverse interest rates’ movements. 
Banks and financial advisors are the economic institutions, which develop new 
instruments to satisfy the needs of customers, gain a profit and move the 
frontier of market. Local municipalities gain in the short run from hedging 
strategies and succeed in reducing costs, but it is not clear which is the burden 
of costs that can potentially come out over a longer period of time.  
 The Corte dei Conti, the administrative controller of Italian public accounting 
and practises, has stated that swap can be used to manage the lower resources 
available from the centre to the periphery of the State; specifically, the interest 
rate swap is designed to exchange interest rates paid on bonds issued on 
domestic and international markets; this practice is allowed since 2001 by the 
State budget law. Tuscany Region, Sicily Region, Provinces of Varese and 
Pavia, Cities of La Spezia, Reggio Emilia, Udine and Venice have used swaps 
advised by J. P. Morgan Chase and other prestigious banks. The Lazio Region 
has opened an Office devoted to help municipalities in the Region to develop 
the best hedging strategy and saving costs. The public sector has to update its 
                                                
6 See Marthinsen, (2003) cap. 6 for data and details. 
7 Marthinsen, by confronting different replication strategies of the portfolio, concludes that 
derivatives’ role in the bankrupt can be considered as much smaller (about 330 million dollars 
over the total 1.6 billion) and poses some doubts about the effective liquidity crisis of the 
County.  
8 The Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili (ICI). 
9 The Imposta sui Redditi delle Attività Produttive (IRAP). 
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knowledge and exploit new financing means and instruments, and their well-
known advantages. 
In a speech at the Italian Senate of the Republic in March 2004, the General 
Director of the Finance Ministry, and actually deputy Minister, Domenico 
Siniscalco (2004a), had explained the way the public sector uses derivatives, 
and guarantees that risks are properly addressed. Some local municipalities 
have been a little bit too aggressive and maybe not much cautious, but sound 
monitoring and control are guaranteed.  
Italian public debt is composed at 54% by long-term fixed rate bonds (Buoni 
Poliennali del Tesoro, BPT), and at 31% by short and long term floating rate 
bonds (Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro, BOT and Certificati di Credito del Tesoro, CCT). 
The share of floating rate bonds is around 25-30%, and the debt’s costs have 
been lowered in the last 10 years, from 14.05% to 3.8%, thanks also to 
lowering European interest rates. Average life of debt has increased, together 
with the duration over the last decade, and reached 5.9 years. Issuance 
techniques of the Italian Governement are auctions, syndications, exchange 
offers and various combinations of the latter (Ministero dell’Economia, 2003). 
Using syndicated deals long-term bonds, foreign currency denominated bonds 
and innovative instruments are placed. 
A bond exchange program has been allowed since 2002 to manage risks 
more efficiently, to obtain a smoother debt redemption profile, and to enhance 
the liquidity of the secondary market (Ministero dell’Economia, 2004a). Debt 
management policy in 2003 has been oriented to new benchmarks on the long 
part of the yield curve, has introduced new inflation-linked bonds, and has 
lowered the amount of floating rate bonds (Ministero dell’Economia, 2004b). 
Debt management in 2004 will follow guidelines for 2003, and issue at least 
8 billion US$ denominated bonds, and 2-2.5 billion in other markets for a total 
10 billion euros (Ministero dell’Economia, 2004b). 
Recently, the Ministry of Economy, Siniscalco (2004b), has given some 
numbers about the activity of local public authorities (Regions, Cities, 
Provinces, and Municipalities) on the use of derivatives and their purposes 
(table 3). The Italian Treasury admits the lack of data about this activity, which 
has reached 856 million euro notional amount total from February to July 2004 
only, and the dynamic evolution of financial markets is an objective obstacle 
against a clear picture of instruments, counterparts and markets involved. 35% 
of Italian Regions, 31% of Municipalities and 28% of Provinces engage in 
swap activities, but many local authorities have not provided complete data. 
What is remarkable is that cost saving is not one of the main reasons for the 
Italian Governement to use derivatives, since it is less than 1% of notional 
value, compared to open market operation (table 4). 
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The Ministry sets which types of derivatives can be traded by public 
authorities, and these are: plain vanilla interest rate swap, interest rate cap, 
interest rate collar, and forward rate agreements (FRAs). All derivatives should 
be “plain vanilla” style, i.e. no derivatives on derivatives, no exotic or structural 
instruments linked to any principal. In particular, knock-in swaps are forbidden 
(i.e. if the Euribor reaches a pre-defined - high - level, the authority pays twice 
the Euribor to the counterpart). Positions are limited too, in particular long 
and short position can be taken on swaps and FRAs, but only long positions 
on cap and collar are allowed. In Table 4 there are some qualitative 
information provided by the Ministry of Economy on request, where options 
are, however, still present. 
The problem of restructuring existing derivatives liabilities, which are not 
allowed any more (like options), is solved by saying that the relative costs 
cannot be shifted to future budget years (when derivatives effectively expire). 
Table 3 Derivatives use by Italian local public administration
Year 2003
Region Overall debt* Swap Up front
Piemonte 331.715.222,50 152.632.379,45 223.291,00
Lombardia 458.371.923,21 97.278.045,99 1.195.416,43
Veneto 286.171.192,51 49.012.653,48 445.047,33
Friuli Venezia Giulia 357.499.369,52 148.342.418,02 0
Liguria 173.803.197,25 81.450.799,54 0
Emilia Romagna 349.023.525,95 66.348.069,61 800.000,00
Nord 1.956.584.430,94 595.064.566,09 2.663.754,76
Toscana 742.289.308,12 229.292.745,33 153.000,00
Umbria 33.623.267,04 33.791.163,27 574.000,00
Marche 176.470.759,53 39.274.213,89 519.935,71
Lazio 177.307.230,68 176.836.220,70 1.971.496,56
Centro 1.129.690.565,37 479.194.543,19 3.218.132,27
Abruzzo 280.636.879,38 134.163.691,18 2.226.427,74
Molise 40.044.999,73 12.290.025,80 250.000,00
Campania 136.754.837,98 33.902.521,29 450.000,00
Puglia 253.410.884,65 174.558.260,08 5.217.431,26
Basilicata 42.219.276,64 21.511.065,98 300.000,00
Calabria 154.272.361,40 128.317.634,48 2.786.077,63
Sicilia 62.420.854,27 32.123.408,79 705.000,00
Sardegna 178.564.898,46 15.489.062,03 0
Sud-Isole 1.148.324.992,51 552.355.669,63 11.934.936,63
TOTAL 4.234.599.988,82 1.626.614.578,91 17.817.123,66
* net of long term financing and short term debt
Source: Corte dei Conti, Il Sole 24 Ore (2004).
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Risks should be bear (and paid) by who raised them. The problem of the 
authority who should look after derivatives’ trading has been solved, since the 
Treasury is the only able to allow for derivatives purchases by local authorities. 
Counterparty in derivatives contracts should have the same rating of the Italian 
republic.  
The database of derivatives activity by local authorities is not accessible, and 
the Treasury admits having some troubles in collecting complete data about 
derivatives from Regions (Siniscalco, 2004, p. 9). No punishment or fine is 
ruled for those providing false (or even no) data. 
The picture of derivatives’ use by the Public sector is not complete at the 
moment, since public data are not provided. They should be given according 
also to European savings protection principles. Every financial operation has 
immediate effects but induces some forms of risk, which can show up in the 
future. This dilemma is as old as the State itself: the incentive to cheat, gain and 
be re-elected can overcome the potential costs of the worse scenario. 
Many other countries, industrialised and developing, engage in derivatives 
activity to hedge on domestic and international markets10. Plain vanilla swaps 
and options are widely used and back office procedures and control are crucial 
not to raise other risks.  
Denmark and Australia, for example, use interest rate and currency swaps to 
lower long-term borrowing costs. Only high rated counterpart (A3, AA) can be 
involved in such operations; preference toward plain vanilla type of contracts is 
given, together with and the inclusion of cross-default clauses, which help 
decreasing credit risks. Other developing countries, having high external debt 
like Brazil, use derivatives to hedge and lower the cost of debt. Monetary 
policy cooperation plays a central role in this last case, since monetary and 
economic conditions are much complicate, and the rating of these countries is 
not very high. 
 
                                                
10 For details see OECD, 2002. 
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Tab. 4 The Italian Public Sector: Derivatives Activity
September 1th, 2004
Types of contracts YES NO
Swap X
Option X
FRAs X
Repurchase agreement X
Forex agreement X
Future X
Other X
Characteristics of Contracts
Underlying
Interest Rate X
Exchange Rate X
Credit
Commodity
Other
Market Structure
Plain vanilla X
Structured X
Exotic
Barrier
knock in
Other
Time lenght
Overnight
One week
One month X
Six Months X
Less than a year X
More than a year X
More than two years X
More than five years X
More than ten years X
Type of Counterparts
Sovereign States
Italian banks and financial intermediaries X
Foreign banks and intermediaries X
Italian firms
Foreign firms
Other
Rating of counterparts
High rated X
Low rated
No rating
Rating is not necessary
Costs of operations: intermediation fee
(as a percentage of notional value)
Less than1% X
Less than 5%
More than 5% but less than 10%
Less than 15%
More than 15%
Other costs
(as a percentage of notional value)
Less than1% X
Less than 5%
More than 5% but less than 10%
Less than 15%
More than 15%
Costs saving with respect to open market operation
(as a percentage of notional value)
Less than1% X
Less than 5%
More than 5% but less than 10%
Less than 15%
More than 15%
Source: Italian Treasury.
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3. Implications of Derivatives’ Use by Fiscal Authorities 
The use of financial innovation and derivatives by public sector has certain 
cost savings’ effects, and brings benefits to national and international financial 
markets, increasing liquidity and efficiency of public debt and deficit 
management. The growth rate of these markets and contracts is justified by 
their efficiency in costs saving and pricing systems, and by their liquidity and 
flexibility; the public sector, as a player of financial markets, benefits from 
financial innovation improvements. 
However, financial innovation directly increases existing risks (market, 
credit, liquidity and counterparty) over a pre-determined time length, and then 
could act in the opposite direction of financial stability. OTC derivatives can 
indirectly induce different forms of risk thanks to the opacity of trading, low 
transparency of settlements systems, and scarce accounting and registration 
principles; moreover, the interaction between central and local public 
authorities using financial innovation can alter financial equilibrium and modify 
the allocation process of resources from the centre to the periphery.  
A public sector characterised by a heavy burden of debt outstanding should 
exhibit low risk loving behaviour, not to increase existing risks; using financial 
innovation for debt and cash management has positive effects, but in case of 
shocks can exacerbate risks, giving raise to a different cost-return of portfolio. 
A distinction between high and low indebted countries has to be done, before 
proceeding with the analysis; financial innovation is a powerful tool of debt 
management and creates positive savings, but European high indebted 
countries (i.e. with debt/GDP ratio more than 70%, like Italy, and Greece) 
have to manage the combination of risks-costs and returns-costs saving of 
financial innovation’s use in order not to modify the dynamic of debt and let it 
become unstable. European countries have to exhibit a decreasing path of debt 
in order to reach the 60% target of debt over GDP (a Maastricht criteria), 
together with a decreasing deficit to sustain the debt reduction process. 
Financial innovation and its cost savings is then particularly attractive for these 
countries, with developed financial markets and international credibility, 
because it helps reaching policy goals, but on the other side should be balanced 
with the public moral hazard in using instruments which can bring future costs. 
European countries have multiple limits on their balance sheet, since they 
have to reach a year budget deficit (G
t
! T
t
) and contribute not to increase 
outstanding debt (B
t!1
). More formally: 
B
t
= B
t!1
+ r
t
B
t!1
+ (G
t
! T
t
)                                          (3.1) 
The dynamic behaviour of European countries debt and deficit should be 
such that: 
lim
t!n
B
t
GDP
t
" 60%                                                       (3.2) 
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An active use of derivatives can be considered as a tool to control the cost 
of debt ( r
t
B
t!1
), to hedge outstanding debt (B
t!1
) and to manage deficit, i.e. 
increasing revenues and decreasing expenses (e.g. by means of privatisation).  
An active use of derivatives for hedging and speculation can be an indirect 
source of financial instability and can influence the investment-saving 
relationship of the public sector. The I-S relationship is dependent on 
sensitivity to invest and save, measured by the slope of the IS curve (steeper or 
flatter); the sensitivity influences the elasticity of the curve with respect to 
income (Y), a part of which is made by investment, and the interest rate (r), the 
price of investment (and savings). Financial innovation, whose use is based on 
expectations, by influencing the ability of the State to borrow on market and 
inducing new risks, trough leverage effects, increases the instability of the I-S 
relationship (its slope can change if adverse shocks take place).  
The indirect effects of derivatives are also to be linked with the tax timing 
options of tax-payers (firms and households), enhancing liquidity risks for the 
State. At a macroeconomic level the tax timing option can influence the 
relationship between investments and savings, since the private sector can have 
more resources at disposal and exhibit more risk loving behaviour, increasing 
the IS curve slope.  
A very active use of derivatives by private and public sectors can be a 
source of “real” instability; derivatives affect financial markets, increasing 
instability in case a shock occurs, but a comprehensive analysis of monetary 
aspects is left to a separate research.  
We can use these intuitions to modify existing macro model and look at the 
effects, positive or not, of the use of financial innovation (securitisation, 
derivatives) by the public sector and analyse policy behaviour, given previous 
country experience. 
 
 
4. A Macro Model Considering Expectations 
Blanchard (1981) extended the traditional IS-LM model to consider the role 
of expectations, of asset prices and their interaction with output. We will 
proceed with summarising Blanchard model in this paragraph, and in following 
sections proceed with extensions.  
Main hypotheses are that “the economy is closed, the physical capital stock 
is constant, there are one good and four marketable assets, which are shares of 
physical capital, there are private short term and long term bonds, issued and 
held by individuals, and outside money”11. There are three main spending 
determinants: “shares of the stock market, which being short term, influences 
                                                
11 See O. Blanchard (1981) p. 132. 
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consumption, and influences investments, by determining capital value, trough 
its replacement cost” (Tobin’s Q). Output depends on stock market and fiscal 
policy.  
Real spending (d) is composed by the stock market value (q), real income (y), 
and influenced by fiscal policy (g). 
 
d = aq + !y + g;
a > 0;
0 < ! "1
     (4.1) 
An interesting consequence of the first equation of 4.1 is that, following an 
increase in aggregate demand, inventories are decumulated first, and then 
production is increased. Output adjusts to spending over time, so that its 
growth rate can be expressed as: 
 
y
•
= !(d " y) = ! (aq + g " by)
! > 0      b #1"$ > 0
    (4.2) 
Spending equals production, but actual spending adjusts slowly to desired 
spending d. 
The asset market is in equilibrium if there is no arbitrage on short term 
return of the three assets; the portfolio balance is characterised by LM curve: 
     
 
i = cy ! h(m ! p)
c > 0;h > 0
r* " i ! p
•
*
     (4.3) 
where i is short term nominal interest rate, y is real income, m is log of nominal 
money, p is log of price level, r is real short term rate, r* is the expected level of 
the rate, and 
 
p
•
*is expected rate of inflation. By imposing no arbitrage between 
long and short term bonds, and considering R as long term interest rate we get 
that: 
     
 
r* = R ! R
•
* /R     (4.4) 
By considering the no arbitrage condition between short-term bonds and 
shares, if q is real value of stock market, the expected real rate of return on 
holding shares is:  
 
q
•
* /q + ! /q,      (4.5) 
where π is real profit, and  
 
! = "
0
+ "
1
y       "
1
# 0      (4.6) 
Following Tobin, the link between financial and real markets is the value of 
stock market, q. The no arbitrage condition between shares and bonds on long 
and short term leads to: 
 
q
•
*
q
+
!
0
+ !
1
y
q
= r *    (4.7) 
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To close the model let’s suppose expectations are rational, so that we miss 
only the equation of price level behaviour.  
First Blanchard simplifies the system by hypothesising fixed prices, so that 
actual and expected inflation is zero; nominal and real variables coincide. At 
the steady state, the system of equations simplifies to: 
 
 
y
•
= !(aq " by + g)
r = cy " h(m " p)
q
•
*
q
+
#
0
+ #
1
y
q
= r
r = R "
R
•
R
     (4.8) 
Expected rate of interest (r*) has been replaced by r, and last equation is the 
term structure. 
Blanchard (1981) looked at the effects of monetary and fiscal expansions 
under fixed price hypothesis and at monetary expansion under flexible price; 
the effects of a discrete change in current or anticipated policy is a discrete 
change in the stock market due to the change in the anticipated sequence of 
profits and interest rates. This, in turn, affects spending and output over time. 
Output and the stock market change because of a policy movement. The 
announcement effect plays a central role in the effectiveness of policy 
manoeuvre, since it can change anticipated profits and discount rate, leading to 
an effective change of the stock market12. The Author underlines a perverse 
effect of fiscal policy announcement, since it can decrease output, because of 
crowding out effect, before the policy is even implemented; this is mainly due 
to the rational expectations hypothesis. 
Rational expectations hypothesis of the Blanchard model is coherent with 
financial innovations’ use by authorities (as other investors) since is not in 
contrast with increasing perfectiveness of financial market following the 
decrease in inefficiencies due to derivatives introduction, as underlined by 
many authors (see for examples Savona, 2004, von Hagen and Fender, 1999). 
The complete information hypothesis and the perfect foresight would render 
the model, although elegant and stylish, useless for policy analysis, being it too 
far from real policy-making. Recent New Keynesian models (Woodford, 2003) 
are trying to fill this gap, but still stay with perfect (asset) market hypothesis, 
which render derivatives useless, or at least not a useful policy instruments; 
given that derivatives in complete and perfect markets are equivalent to the 
underlying asset, why should the central bank look at derivatives? Moreover, 
these models consider the Government as issuing risk-less bonds; this last 
hypothesis is the most difficult to modify since it introduces non-linear 
                                                
12 See O. Blanchard (1981) page 141. 
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solution and infinite equilibria (a first attempt has been made by Benigno and 
Woodford, 2004), rendering the model less intelligible.  
 
5. A Modified Model to Consider Financial Innovation’s Use in Fiscal 
Policy 
5.1 The model 
In this sections we will try to modify Blanchard model to consider explicitly 
financial innovation as a tool of fiscal policy; Blanchard model is flexible 
enough to model a modern fiscal policy behaviour, considering monetary 
policy as given and not dependent from fiscal policy, and a portfolio approach. 
The Blanchard model is also free of the criticisms we explained in the previous 
paragraph. We consider as given the separation between the two policy 
authorities and do not alter any characteristic of monetary policy with respect 
to the Blanchard original model. We are conscious that financial innovation 
alters financial market’s behaviour as well (i.e. LM curve), and this should be 
directly modelled. This issue has been addressed by Savona (2004) and will be 
further developed in a separate research project. 
The introduction of financial innovation use into fiscal policy behaviour (g) 
changes slightly the specification of the model, and its main implications. The 
distinction between short and long-term adjustment will be given. An active 
use of financial innovation is particularly interesting for those countries 
characterised by high deficit and debt, either domestic or foreign currency 
denominated; financial innovation can be particularly useful for cash 
management and hedging, to lower costs and bettering portfolio balancing. 
Our analysis will be focused on heavily indebted countries, or running high 
deficit like Italy, the U.S., and Brazil.  
The index of fiscal policy, g, contrary to Blanchard model, where it was 
considered as full employment deficit target, here has to be considered as the 
debt-deficit level targets. Decreasing debt and deficit targets are assimilated to a 
restrictive fiscal policy, and this comes with a lowering public expenditure, 
decreasing national spending (d). Fiscal policy uses financial innovation to 
hedge and, basing on some expectations on future interest rates level, fixes the 
amount of interest to be paid on bonds, in between a certain corridor of rates. 
To introduce financial innovation we need to consider expectations13. 
We can introduce expectations in the model, by assuming that the no 
arbitrage condition considers risk premium (χ).  
 
R !
R
•
R
= r + " = i ! p*+"       (5.1.1) 
Expectations are the most important ingredient in a portfolio composed of 
bonds, money and financial innovation; we have to clarify a bit more the 
dynamic evolution of debt and expenditure in order to consider the case of 
                                                
13 See O. Blanchard and S. Fischer (1989), page 532. 
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European Highly Indebted Countries. These countries usually look for an 
investment strategy, having some pre-determined expectations over future 
interest rates, and choose a corridor of rates which is compatible with deficit 
and debt evolution (
 
r* ! r ! r **). The dynamic of debt and deficit in each 
period of time is given by:  
 
B
t
= I
t
+ B
t!1
+ DEF
t
;  DEF
t
= G
t
!T
t
= G
t
! tY
t
;   I
t
= rB
t!1
 (5.1.2) 
This relationship simplifies to: 
G
t
= B
t
! (1+ r)B
t!1
+ tY
t
      (5.1.3) 
where the public spending is dependent on debt (past and present) and a 
function of income; European countries have two binding conditions which 
states that deficit and debt should converge to pre-determined levels, in order 
not to introduce asymmetric shocks in the Union. The elasticity of spending to 
interest rate (ψ) for these countries is then higher than that to income (η), 
being the exit from the Union a non acceptable policy behaviour.  
 We can synthesise this relationship of fiscal policy over interest rate and 
income elasticities, depending on debt outstanding, as: 
g = !r +" y
! >"  
       (5.1.4) 
We can hypothesis that the sensitivity of fiscal policy, represented by the IS 
curve, to income (ψ), in between the pre-determined interest rates, high (r**) 
and low (r*) compatible with the desired derivatives strategy, is very low or 
even constant, since the target of costs of debt (It) and deficit are given trough 
the use of financial innovation14. In this corridor the sensitivity of fiscal policy 
to interest rates (η) is greater that that to income (ψ) since the goal over debt is 
dominating over the output. Derivatives are used to lower (It) the cost of debt 
and control (Gt) over some expectations on rates, as shown in the previous 
survey of countries’ experiences. In this corridor we can say that income is no 
longer a primary target of fiscal policy since the target of debt-deficit cannot be 
achieved if another is followed15. Financial innovation is used to settle the cost 
of debt (or deficit) g basing on some expectations over interest rates, whose 
level is settled by the market, and income (or unemployment if you prefer) 
becomes a secondary policy target. We have to underline that this trade-off 
between income and debt-deficit targets of fiscal policy is true in the short run, 
since long run equilibrium of the model cannot depend on financial 
innovation, which bets over short-term rates and is based on expectations. 
If public debt outstanding (B) is not high, the two elasticities become 
relevant for fiscal policy, and income plays an explicit role for fiscal policy. The 
IS curve has still income in its specification, but fiscal policy spending, g, is 
                                                
14 E.g. swaps or forward contracts with which a bet over interest rates is possible and 
contribute to save costs. 
15 This is the same idea of the unholy trinity for monetary policy and the exchange rate. Here 
the ingredients of the trinity are high debt-deficit outstanding, autonomous monetary policy 
and output target. The third target is not achievable by fiscal authority given the other two.  
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under control only in between a corridor of rates (
 
r* ! r ! r **) where 
financial market and innovation contributes to control the dynamic evolution 
of debt and deficit. 
 
Starting from public spending (d) we can state that it is a function of income 
(y) in the short run, of debt-deficit target (g), and of stock market value (q), 
where the debt is managed. We can rearrange the short-term model as: 
 
 
d = aq + g + !y        IS curve
a > 0   ! > 0
Iff    r* " r " r **    Interest rate corridor
r = cy # h(m # p)    LM curve
q
•
*
q
+
$0 + $1y
q
= r    No - arbitrage condition
r + % = R #
R
•
R
          Term structure
   (5.1.5) 
Fiscal policy index is very sensible to interest rates, so that if 
 
r* ! r ! r ** 
(expectations of the State over interest rates are satisfied) the dynamic of debt 
and deficit is under control, and financial innovation contributes to lower the 
cost of debt and public spending. 
Short-term interest rates are settled through the interaction between the LM 
curve, the no arbitrage condition and the term structure, so that the market 
settles interest rates, and the fiscal authority has no power to influence them. 
Since interest rates represent the cost of debt, financial innovation is used to 
settle a pre-defined cost of debt over constant expectation on long-term rate 
(R), and certain risk premium (χ). Fiscal policy uses derivatives to control g in 
the spending function.  
Into the corridor of rates, 
 
r* ! r ! r **, the equilibrium between the IS, the 
LM and market is such that all targets are satisfied: fiscal policy reaches the 
desired levels of debt and deficit, monetary policy controls money (or prices), 
the market settles the interest rate and income (y) is in equilibrium.  
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Outside the corridor of rates (  
 
r ! r*;r " r **) the IS curve reaches an 
equilibrium which is associated with either higher or lower debt-deficit (area 1 
or 3 in graph 1), if the LM curve is not moving16. 
                                                
16 A further development of the model would be to allow the LM curve to react and move; this 
will be done in a separate research project. 
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Financial innovation with constant risk aversion, χ, and no exogenous 
shock can be effective to control short-term costs of debt-deficit. Fixed price 
let the story to be the simplest, since the equilibrium is the desired.  
If a shock occurs, changing expectations over long-term rates (R), and risk 
aversion (χ), given that the no arbitrage condition is binding, 
 
q
•
*
q
+
!
0
+ !
1
y
q
= r , the relevant equilibrium can lie outside the corridor, and 
the system is that described by Blanchard, but with an uncontrolled debt-
deficit dynamic.  
Long run solution of the model17 can be found by imposing that income 
equals spending (y=d), fiscal policy controls 
 
g , the market expects r, and 
monetary policy controls 
 
m ; prices are fixed (
 
p) and we can compute risk 
aversion (χ). The system solves finally: 
 
y =
a
b
q +
1
b
g
q =
!
r
=
"
0
+ "
1
y
cy # h(m # p)
R # $ = cy # h(m # p)
      (5.1.6)  
The long run solution is such that output depends on fiscal policy and the 
stock market; the stock market is the ratio between steady state profit and 
interest rate18. The two curves have the traditional shapes but come from 
modified hypothesis and behaviour.  
The target of debt and deficit can be reached in the short run by means of 
derivatives and securitisation; in the long run risk premium and exogenous 
shock let the game much difficult to play since the equilibrium is set by the 
interaction between market and policies. 
Our first conclusion is to underline the very positive role of financial 
innovation in matching short-term targets of debt-deficit (
 
g), given 
autonomous monetary policy (
 
m ), financial markets setting r, fixed prices (
 
p ), 
but losing control over output target (y) by fiscal authority (i.e. sensitivity to 
income target is lower if debt outstanding is high).  
This theoretic result seems to be confirmed by the behaviour of high 
indebted countries, which are involved in many OTC derivatives transactions 
and run high risk in exchange of lowering debt-deficit dynamic over the last 
decade. 
 
 
                                                
17 Hp: 
 
R
•
= p
•
= q
•
= q
•
* = 0 and solve for y, q and r, given exogenous variables. 
18 O. Blanchard (1981) page 134. 
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5.2 Shocks to the model and the effectiveness of policy 
Considering fixed price level, if a shock occurs and changes risk aversion of 
the public sector, χ, the term structure and the equilibrium rate change, 
influencing the slope if the curves first, and the final equilibrium of the system 
after. If risk aversion increases, so that the public sector accepts less risk (and 
lower return) the short term rate r lowers, influencing capital market value. If 
the rate falls below the lower level accepted by the public sector (
 
r ! r *), the 
IS becomes elastic with respect to market interest rates since derivatives 
become “out of the money”. The Tobin’s Q is the link between real and 
financial markets, and if market rates are lower, capital market value lowers and 
the equilibrium is at lower level of all variables. Fiscal policy could have not 
reached its target of debt-deficit, being at a lower level. 
If a shock occurs and lowers expectations over capital market value (q*) the 
final effect is the same as described above. 
Another shock can be considered a change in g, for example in a climate of 
elections. If the target of fiscal policy, g, changes, e.g. increases, so that we aim 
at reaching a lower debt-deficit target, the effect is that of a restrictive fiscal 
policy, moving to the lower bound of rates (
 
r! r *). This can be managed 
using more financial innovation thus decreasing risk aversion (χ) accepted by 
the public sector. 
If a shock to financial market changes expected long-term rate (R) the term 
structure changes, and rational expectations incorporate this in short-term rates 
and the capital market value increases. If the interest rate falls above the 
highest accepted by fiscal authority,  
 
r ! r **, derivatives become “out of the 
money” and the final equilibrium is expansionary on output but “out of the 
money” for debt management (area 1 in graph 1). 
Generally speaking, unless an un-anticipated shock occurs to the economy, 
derivatives are very good instruments to reach desired target levels of debt and 
deficit, lowering the sensitivity over income level; if a shock occurs, derivatives 
can exacerbate its effects, and alter financial stability of public sector, by 
changing its liquidity risk and lead to any equilibrium with high undesired 
deficit. 
An expansionary monetary policy, moving the LM curve up to the right, can 
have different effects if the final equilibrium is inside or outside the corridor of 
rate (
 
r* ! r ! r **); the better solution would be to get a level of rate inside the 
corridor, so that monetary and fiscal targets are reached at the same time. If the 
un-cooperative monetary policy manoeuvre leads to reach a rate outside the 
corridor,   
 
r ! r **, the fiscal is in contrast with monetary policy and market 
expectations over r influence the equilibrium. 
Our second conclusion is that fiscal policy can be considered as completely 
effective over its target of debt and deficit, without disturbing real spending 
and income, if the interest rate settled by the interaction with the market is at 
the desired level; in this way expectations are satisfied and no contrast between 
monetary and fiscal policy, and the market arises. The focus then has to be put 
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over the correct level of the rate to be expected by fiscal policy, to be coherent 
with the market and monetary authority. The burden of risk implied in the use 
of financial innovation has to be properly considered, since can modify 
financial stability of the public sector. 
In short survey of countries using derivatives to manage cash and debt, 
Brazil is one paying attention to this interaction, shows low risk loving 
behaviour, and monetary policy coordination, so that the market support the 
investment and hedging strategy. Italy has shown a fragmented behaviour, 
since, centrally and locally, a scarce flow of information and coordination is 
provided; risk loving should be low since the national burden of debt is very 
high, but provisional data about the use of financial innovation seems reveal an 
aggressive behaviour. We suppose that the Italian Government has some 
interest rates expectations, and up to now these have been coherent with 
markets rates. In official document we did not find any concern or explanation 
regarding liquidity risk of the State, which can be altered by financial 
innovation’s use, or regarding adverse shock effects. 
 
Concluding remarks  
We have looked at the use of derivatives by fiscal authority and observed 
that the necessary attention has not yet been paid to the link between policy 
targets and financial innovation’s use. Political debate and traditional economic 
analysis have not focused on the effects on financial stability of public sector 
using and facing innovations; the use of derivatives is mainly, but not only, 
devoted to cost saving and hedging debt. Financial stability of the public sector 
is strictly related to its liquidity risk, which needs a special attention. 
A simple IS-LM model has been used to develop the analysis starting from 
Blanchard (1981), which introduced expectations and capital market value into 
the traditional IS-LM framework; the author analysed the effectiveness of 
anticipated and un-anticipated monetary and fiscal policy manoeuvres under 
rational expectations’ hypothesis, fixed and flexible prices, and effects on 
capital market value.  
Introducing derivatives into the IS curve as debt and deficit management 
tool, we reach the following conclusions; first is to underline the very positive 
role of financial innovation in matching short-term targets of debt-deficit (
 
g), 
given autonomous monetary policy (
 
m ), financial markets setting r, fixed 
prices (
 
p ), but losing control over output target (y) by fiscal authority (i.e. 
elasticity to income is lower that that to interest rate if debt outstanding is 
high). 
Our second conclusion is that fiscal policy can be considered as completely 
effective over its target of debt and deficit, without disturbing real spending 
and income, if the interest rate settled by the interaction with the market is at 
the desired level; in this way expectations are satisfied and no contrast between 
monetary and fiscal policy, and the market arises. The focus then has to be put 
over the correct level of the rate to be expected by fiscal policy, to be coherent 
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with the market and monetary authority. The burden of risk implied in the use 
of financial innovation has to be properly considered, since can modify 
financial stability of the public sector; the burden of risks can exacerbate 
negative effects over interest rates rendering derivatives “out of the money”, 
and modifying debt and deficit dynamic.  
With that respect, the example of the Italian Government is remarkable, 
since the dynamic of debt and deficit is managed trough the use of financial 
innovation, centrally and locally, and is effective in the short run; on the long 
run the burden of risk is not known, and only recently the Ministry of 
Economy, Siniscalco, has asked not to increase future risks by means of 
innovation and asked for restructuring portfolio of local authorities. Data 
about the future burden are not known. 
The cooperation between fiscal and monetary authority, like that developed 
by Brazil, can lead to a better equilibrium (inside the corridor of rates), but this 
is not new to economic theory.  
Further study should consider the behaviour of monetary policy and the 
LM curve with respect to financial innovation use and financial stability, but a 
higher disclosure of data and risks effectively run is not to be any more 
delayed.   
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